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Abstract:  The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 with amendments in 1962 is 
inconsistent regarding FDA certification of a drug’s efficacy.  The act requires 
efficacy certification for the drug’s initial (“on-label”) uses, but does not require 
certification before physicians may prescribe for subsequent (“off-label”) uses.  Are 
there good reasons for this inconsistency?  Using a sequential online survey we 
carried on a “virtual conversation” with some 500 physicians.  The survey asked 
whether efficacy requirements should be imposed on off-label uses, and almost all 
physicians said no.  It asked whether the efficacy requirements for initial uses should 
be dropped, and most said no.  We then gently challenged respondents asking them 
whether opposing efficacy requirements in one case but not the other involved an 
inconsistency.  In response to this challenge we received hundreds of written 
commentaries.  This investigation taps the specialized knowledge of hundreds of 
physicians and organizes their insights into challenges to the consistency argument.  
Thus, it employs a method of structured conversations with experts to test the merit of 
an argument.  Is the consistency argument a case of “foolish consistency,” or does it 
hold up even under scrutiny? 
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  1Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy 
Requirements? 





The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 with amendments in 1962 forbids 
new drugs from being sold unless they have passed FDA-approved tests for safety and 
efficacy in a specified use, called the “on-label” use.  Physicians are allowed, 
however, to prescribe an FDA-approved drug not only for its on-label use, but also for 
other “off-label” uses.  It often happens that physicians and researchers discover new 
uses for a drug after it has been permitted, so off-label use is quite common.  Shapiro 
(1979) and Tabarrok (2000) argue that this combination of positions, as embodied in 
the law, is inconsistent.  Either FDA efficacy requirements are on-net beneficial, in 
which case they should apply to all drug uses, or they are not, in which case they 
should be withdrawn for all drug uses. 
To explore the policy lessons of off-label usage, we tapped the knowledge and 
judgment of actual practitioners.  We asked physicians, Should the FDA hold drug 
uses to efficacy requirements?, both as the question applies to initial (on-label) uses 
and as it applies to subsequent (off-label) uses.  Virtually all opposed imposing 
efficacy requirements on subsequent uses.  A significant minority also opposed FDA 
efficacy requirements on initial uses.  But the majority supported the FDA efficacy 
requirements on initial uses while opposing them for subsequent uses.  Is it 
  2inconsistent to favor efficacy requirements for new drugs but not for new uses of old 
drugs? 
  We asked physicians that, too.  We asked them to justify their responses in an 
open-ended format, and received hundreds of justifications of their opinions about 
FDA policy.  The key feature of our study is asking physicians the justification 
question.  We think of our investigation as a less conventional form of scientific 
testing (see Blinder et al.1998 and Bewley 1999 on using surveys in this manner).  If 
the consistency argument for FDA liberalization has serious weaknesses, physicians 
(practitioners and researchers) would be in a special position to identify and expose 
those weaknesses.  Better than anyone else, physicians would know the hazards of 
allowing drugs lacking FDA efficacy certification onto the market.  We engaged some 
500 experts in structured conversation, bringing their knowledge to bear on the 
important scientific hypothesis: Making initial FDA efficacy certification optional 
would improve social welfare.  Our method should be distinguished from surveys that 
collect data or merely elicit stated preferences.  Our interactive survey asks for 
justifications.  Each “observation” is the generation of a separate conversation.  We 
turn to the doctors, not because they are authorities on the economics of FDA policy, 
but because they may be in a special position to challenge insightfully the 






   
  3II.  The Consistency Argument:   
If Off-Label Uses Should Not Require FDA Efficacy Certification, Why 
Should On-Label Uses Require FDA Efficacy Certification? 
  
  Again, when the FDA evaluates a new drug, the evaluation of safety and 
efficacy is made with respect to a specified use.  Once a drug has been permitted, 
physicians often come to prescribe the drug for other uses.  Amoxicillin has an on-
label use for treating respiratory tract infections and an off-label use for treating 
stomach ulcers.  For the on-label treatment of respiratory tract infections, amoxicillin 
has been tested and certified in all three phases of the FDA’s Investigational New 
Drug clinical study; phase I trials for basic safety and phase II and phase III trials for 
efficacy.  For the treatment of stomach ulcers, however, amoxicillin has not gone 
through FDA phase II and phase III trials and thus is not FDA certified for this use.  
Amoxicillin will never go through FDA efficacy trials for the treatment of stomach 
ulcers because the basic formulation is no longer under patent.  Yet any textbook or 
medical guide discussing stomach ulcers will mention amoxicillin as a potential 
treatment, and today a physician who did not consider prescribing amoxicillin or other 
antibiotics for the treatment of stomach ulcers would be considered negligent.   
  Off-label prescribing is very common in all areas of medicine.  It is not 
uncommon for a drug to be prescribed more often off-label than on-label.  
Thalidomide has been approved for use in treating leprosy but is much more 
commonly used to treat multiple myeloma and AIDS.   Most cancer and AIDS 
patients are given drugs that are not FDA certified for the prescribed use (GAO 1991; 
Brosgart et al. 1996).   In a large number of fields, a majority of patients are 
prescribed at least one drug off-label (Tabarrok 2000: 26). 
  4  But there seems to be a logical inconsistency in allowing off-label uses and 
requiring proof of efficacy for the drug's initial use.  Logical consistency would seem 
to require that one either  
 
(1) be in favor of allowing physicians to prescribe off-label and of allowing 
physicians to prescribe (and pharmaceutical companies to make and sell) 
new drugs that have not been FDA efficacy certified,  
or 
(2)  be against allowing physicians to prescribe off-label and against allowing 
physicians to prescribe (and pharmaceutical companies to make and sell) 
new drugs that have not been FDA efficacy certified. 
 
    Logical consistency does not tell us which of the above two choices is 
preferable.  Tabarrok (2000) argues for the first alternative.  FDA requirements might 
enhance the safety and effectiveness of drugs eventually permitted, but FDA 
requirements have  at least two negative effects.  First, they delay the arrival of 
superior drugs.  Second, they increase the costs and uncertainties of bringing a new 
drug to market; hence, many drugs that would have been developed are not.  All the 
people who would have been helped by these drugs are not.  Beginning with Peltzman 
(1973), many researchers have evaluated these costs and benefits, and to a striking 
degree reach a consensus that on the margin the FDA regulation is deleterious (for a 
literature review see Klein and Tabarrok 2002).   
Tabarrok (2000) argues that off-label usage provides a “natural experiment.”  
In a sense, off-label uses are regulated according to the pre-1962 rules, under which 
the FDA held new drugs only to safety requirements, whereas on-label uses are 
  5regulated according to the post-1962 rules.  Thus, the same medical institutions – in 
the same country at the same time – are operating under dual systems of drug 
regulation.  Off-label prescribing, according to this argument, gives us an idea of how 
medical affairs would proceed in a world in which new drugs were allowed until 
banned, rather than banned until permitted.  Physicians learn of off-label uses from 
medical research and experience conveyed by peer-reviewed publications, 
newsletters, lecture presentations, conferences, advertising, and conversations with 
trusted colleagues.  The new learning comes from many sources: utilization and 
outcome reviews, clinical and epidemiological studies, new theories advanced by 
scientists, new judgments made by professional and scientific bodies, and new results 
reported by pharmaceutical companies.  As the enterprise of medical science 
proceeds, the new learning flows to the medical practitioners, albeit in fits and starts.  
Scientists and physicians, working through professional associations and 
organizations, make official determinations of "best practice" of off-label uses in 
standard reference compendia such as AMA Drug Evaluations, American Hospital 
Formulary Service Drug Information, and U.S. Pharmacopoeia Drug Indications.  
Tabarrok (2000) points to such professional, science-based listings and determinations 
as examples of the nongovernmental, nonmandatory certifications that could – and 
perhaps should – replace FDA certification of new drugs.  
  The difference between the on-label and off-label markets is thus not that the 
off-label market is "unregulated" but that it is unregulated by the FDA.  So far as 
efficacy is concerned, the off-label market is regulated by the consent of patients and 
the diverse forms of certification made by physicians and medical institutions. 
  Shapiro (1979) also recognizes the inconsistency in current practices, but 
draws a lesson opposite from Tabarrok.  Shapiro (p.801) calls the freedom to 
  6prescribe off-label “a regulatory anomaly which deprives some drug consumers of the 
protection of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act.”  Rather than favoring the 
liberalization of new drugs he argues for tightening restrictions on off-label 
prescribing.  Such a position has also been taken by the FDA,
2 although since 1982 
the FDA has focused its efforts on limiting pharmaceutical manufacturers rather than 
physicians.
3  Figure 1 shows how the principle of consistency gives rise to dual 
arguments for reform. 
                                                 
2 In 1972, for example, the FDA announced that there were no extant controls on off-label prescribing 
but that “when an unapproved use of a new drug may endanger patients or create a health hazard” it 
was “obligated” to act.  Thus, it proposed a proceeding to create controls.  It planned to consider the 
following new rules:  revoking the approval of any drug extensively used off-label; regulating off-label 
uses as experimental (just as if the drug was a new drug); and limiting distribution channels to hospitals 
or physicians with special qualifications.  The medical profession, including the AMA, objected 
vociferously, however, and the FDA backed down.  Over the next decade the FDA asked Congress for 
similar powers but was not successful.  On the 1972 episode see Shapiro (1979) and Christopher 
(1993).  David Kessler (1978), prior to becoming FDA commissioner, also supported restrictions on 
off-label prescribing, and under his leadership in 1991 the FDA indicated that it was re-examining the 
off-label question but no new rules materialized.   
3 In 1982 the FDA issued a bulletin formally stating that it condoned off-label use as "accepted medical 
practice." 12 FDA Drug Bull. (United States Food and Drug Admin., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1982, at 
4 but this has not precluded significant FDA impact on off-label usage, as FDA tightly restricts 
manufacturers’ speech about off-label uses.   
  7Figure 1: 








































  Our survey put this debate to physicians.  Nearly all of the 492 responding 
physicians opposed placing restrictions on off-label prescribing.  But a majority 
opposed the parallel proposal to liberalize the permitting of new drugs.  Thus, most 
physicians, taking “inconsistent” positions, supported the status quo.  After the 
physician had taken his positions, the consistency argument was presented and the 
physician was asked to respond in an open-ended format.  Most of the “inconsistent” 
physicians stuck to their guns and offered justifications for their combination of 
positions. 
  8One physician responded by quoting Emerson: “A foolish consistency is the 
hobgoblin of little minds.”  Like more than 150 responding physicians, he gave his 
reasons for deeming the consistency argument flawed or imperfect.  We organize the 
written responses into separate challenges to the consistency argument (the complete 
set of responses is available online
4).  We re-examine the consistency argument for 
liberalization in light of what the physicians said about it.   
 
III.  The Survey and the Main Quantitative Results 
 
Survey Logistics 
We drafted the questionnaire so as to pose the two main policy questions and 
then the consistency argument.  We hired HostedWare.com to host the survey online.  
The questions were presented sequentially: Each important question appeared on its 
own Web image and the respondent had to provide his or her answer to that question 
before proceeding to the next question.  The survey limited responses to one-per-
computer.  To get physicians to access and complete the survey, we hired Medical 
Marketing Services to send an e-mail message to 8000 physicians.
5  The broadcast 
message invited the physician to aid academic research on pharmaceutical regulation 
by accessing and responding to the brief questionnaire at the URL provided.  The 
message asked the recipient not to share the URL with others.  We instructed Medical 
Marketing Services to randomly select physicians in certain fields including 
allergy/immunology, cardiology, endocrinology, neurology, oncology, urology, 
internal medicine, geriatrics, and pediatrics.  The e-mail broadcast yielded 504 
                                                 
4 The complete (and organized) set of challenges, “consistent” comments, and final comments can be 
accessed online at the working papers section of Tabarrok’s web site, http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/.  
5 The cost of the HostedWare services was $710 and the cost of the Medical Marketing Services was 
$3,752. 
  9physicians who answered at least one question and 492 who completed the survey by 
answering at least one of the main policy questions (a response rate of about six 
percent). 
When a responding physician clicked on the indicated URL, he came to a 
simple Web image titled “Opinion Survey on Pharmaceutical Regulation,” and a brief 
welcoming message about responses being anonymous and used only for purposes of 
academic research.  The respondent clicked a button called “Begin Survey” which led 
directly to seven preliminary questions about the respondent’s practice.   
 
The Preliminary Questions 
The seven preliminary questions are provided here (the numbering 1 through 7 
did not appear in the survey).  The response-rate percentages or other summary 
information are indicated, as is the absolute number of respondents [in square 
brackets]: 
1)  What state do you practice in? 
47 states in total were represented with the five largest being 
   CA     11%  [54] 
   NY     8%  [40] 
   TX     7%  [34] 
   FL     5%  [26] 
   NC     4%  [22] 
 
2)  How many years have you been in practice? 
The distribution was described by the following: 
Minimum    0  [6] 
Maximum    48  [2] 
Mean     16 
Standard Deviation    11 
 
3)  What are your areas of clinical specialization? 
After collapsing multiple responses into single responses (e.g. 
Hematology/oncology is listed under oncology) and subsuming pediatric [blank] 
into pediatrics (e.g. pediatric oncology and pediatric allergy are both listed under 
pediatric) the top five categories were: 
   Internal  Medicine   29%  [142] 
   Pediatrics    28%  [138] 
   Cardiology    9%  [46] 
   Neurology    9%  [44] 
   Oncology    8%  [38]     
 
 
  104)  Are you employed at or affiliated with a teaching hospital?  
•  Yes     58 %  [288] 
•  No     41 %  [203] 
 
5)  Most physicians have careers principally as practitioners and some are 
also involved in doing and publishing medical research (some also teach, 
but let’s put that aside).  Of the following choices how would you describe 
your career. 
a.  Strictly practitioner, not a researcher   46%  [228] 
b.  Mainly a practitioner, only limited involvement 
 in research                      38%   [188] 
c.  About half practitioner, half researcher   11%  [52] 
d.  Mainly a researcher (with, of course,  
some practice along the way)    2%  [10] 
e.  Not sure/ Not applicable     3%  [14] 
 
6)  When the FDA approves a drug, it does so for a certain specified use.  
Often the drug is later found to have other uses, known as off-label uses, 
for which physicians may also prescribe the drug. 
 
How often do you prescribe drugs for off-label indications? 
a.  More than 40 percent of my prescriptions 
are  off-label     9% [44] 
b.  Between 30 and 40 percent    12% [60] 
c.  Between 20 and 30 percent    17%  [83] 
d.  Between 10 and 20 percent    19% [92] 
e.  Between 5 and 10 percent     18% [91] 
f.  Less than 5 percent      18%  [88]
6 
g.  Don’t know/ Not sure      7%  [34] 
 
7)  In your medical practice, do you treat children? 
a.  N e v e r       33% [161] 
b.  R a r e l y       20% [100] 
c.  Sometimes      10% [50] 
d.  O f t e n       7%  [34] 
e.  A l w a y s       29%  [147] 
 
 
The preliminary questions indicate that we received responses from a diverse 





                                                 
6 Reported rates of off-label prescribing should not be used as estimates of off-label prescribing 
because physicians often do not know whether an indication is off-label.  The Appendix here shows 
that reported rates correlate with support for FDA liberalization. 
  11The Two Main Questions 
 
Next, the respondent encountered the two main questions.  One asked about 
the imposing of efficacy requirements on off-label uses: 
What would be your position on a proposal to change FDA law so that 
physicians could not prescribe drugs for off-label uses?  Would you favor or 
oppose such a change? 
 
•  F a v o r       2% [12] 
•  Oppose    94% [460] 
•  Don’t know/ Not sure      4% [20] 
 
Of 492 physicians answering the question, 460 opposed ending the freedom to 
prescribe off-label.
7  Thus, we conclude that virtually all physicians favor being 
allowed to prescribe off-label.  Several respondents volunteered strongly worded 
objections to the idea of banning off-label prescribing.  Such a reform would be 
“clearly naïve,” “stupid and unethical,” “dangerous,” “disastrous,” and “medicine 
would grind to a halt.”
8 
Given the overwhelming support among physicians for off-label prescribing it 
is clear that they will not accept the consistency argument for further FDA control.  It 
does not follow, however, that they will accept the consistency argument for 
liberalization.  Since the argument for further FDA control of off-label prescribing has 
almost no support, we often refer to the consistency argument for liberalization as 
simply “the consistency argument.” 
The other main question asked about dropping the efficacy requirements on 
initial uses: 
                                                 
7  Analysis of the complete responses suggests that a number of the 32 physicians who answered either 
“Favor” or “Don’t know/ Not sure,” had actually gotten confused and got “the sign” wrong when 
answering the question. 
8 The remarks come from written comments f63, g58, f157, f47, and f51.   (“f63” means the 63th final 
comment.  “g58” means the 58
th challenge.  Elsewhere we indicate “consistent” comments with a “c.”)  
Here and elsewhere we take the liberty of correcting spelling and occasionally improving minor 
punctuation.  The respondents’ written comments are available online in their original form. 
  12Under current law, when the FDA reviews an application for a new drug, it holds 
the drug to both safety and efficacy requirements before permitting the drug. 
 
What would be your position on a proposal to change FDA law so that 
physicians could prescribe a new drug once the current FDA safety 
requirements had been met?
 [
9]  Under this system, manufacturers and 
researchers could continue with efficacy certification (from the FDA or some 
other institution) if they so choose, but physicians would not be prevented from 
prescribing drugs that did not have efficacy certification from the FDA. 
 
In brief, what would be your position on a proposal to make the FDA efficacy 
standards an optional form of certification, rather than a requirement as at 
present? 
 
•  F a v o r       27% [133] 
•  Oppose    58% [284] 
•  Don’t know/ Not sure      15% [75] 
 
Given how little the average American questions the FDA, it may be 
surprising that 42 percent of the physicians were not decidedly in favor of retaining 
initial efficacy requirements, and 27 percent favored eliminating FDA efficacy 
requirements.  But these numbers are consistent with previous studies.  The 
Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, has posed a very similar question 
in five telephone surveys of physicians conducted by The Polling Company.  After 
asking several questions which do bring out the costs of drug restrictions, CEI 
consistently finds that a majority of physician respondents “Strongly Favor” or 
“Somewhat Favor” making unapproved drugs and devices “available to physicians as 
                                                 
9 (This note was not included in the survey.) Physicians in the U.S. may prescribe drugs that have not 
been FDA approved (such prescriptions might be filled by pharmacies abroad or domestic institutions 
engaged in drug trials).  In practice, however, a physician’s ability to prescribe a drug is tied to the 
manufacturer’s right to market and sell the drug in the U.S.  To keep our survey questions from 
becoming overly complicated, we often employed phraseology that would suggest that the FDA 
directly regulates prescribing.  We are confident that this simplification did not bias or blur the 
investigation, as not a single physician remarked on this technicality or appeared to be confused 
because of it.    
  13long as they carry a warning about their unapproved status,” while a minority answer 
“Somewhat Opposed” or “Strongly Opposed”.
10  Our results and those of CEI show 
that there is not a strong consensus among physicians about the desirability of initial 
efficacy requirements.  Here, about 25 percent of physicians are in line with the 
consistency argument – they favor being able to prescribe off-label and drugs lacking 
initial FDA efficacy certification.  The majority, however, gave “inconsistent” 
responses. 
 
The Consistency Argument 
 
The majority who gave “inconsistent” responses next encountered the 
following statement and question
11: 
 
I noticed that you answered in favor of physicians being allowed to prescribe 
off-label but against physicians being allowed to prescribe new drugs that had 
met FDA safety requirements but not FDA efficacy requirements. 
 
Because off-label indications have not been FDA-certified for efficacy, some 
people argue that off-label prescribing is equivalent to prescribing a new drug 
that has been FDA safety-certified but not FDA efficacy-certified.  According to 
this argument, to be consistent, one should either be in favor of allowing 
physicians to prescribe off-label *and* allowing physicians to prescribe new 
drugs that have not been FDA efficacy-certified, or against both kinds of 
allowances. 
 
How do the following choices best reflect your thoughts on this arguments? 
 
•  It’s an interesting argument but I would need more time to think about it 
before responding to it.    7% [19] 
•  The argument makes me less inclined to support off-label prescribing.
      4% [11] 
•  The argument makes me more inclined to support allowing physicians 
to prescribe new drugs that have not been efficacy-certified by the FDA.
      8% [20] 
•  I think the argument is invalid.  Letting doctors prescribe off-label 
differs from the proposed reform of letting them prescribe new drugs 
                                                 
10 Competitive Enterprise Institute 2002 summarizes all five CEI surveys conducted from 1995 to 2002. 
11 We varied the survey so that the posing of the two main questions was ordered one way in one 
survey and the reverse in the other.  We found that the order of the questions did not make a significant 
difference.  Thus the precise wording of the consistency question varied slightly depending on the order 
of the questions. 
  14that have not been efficacy-certified by the FDA because: [a text-box for 
open-ended responses followed]      80% [205] 
 
This presentation of the consistency argument led 12 percent to reconsider 
their views – with almost twice as many revising in favor of liberalization as opposed 
to expanding restrictions – but the majority of respondents were unmoved by the 
argument.  This is unsurprising, as few people quickly change their minds upon 
encountering an argument (especially in an impersonal Web survey).  
An assessment of the consistency argument was also solicited from the 
physicians who gave “consistent” responses
12: 
I noticed that you answered in favor of physicians being allowed to prescribe 
off-label and in favor of allowing physicians to prescribe new drugs that met 
FDA safety requirements but not FDA efficacy requirements. 
 
Preliminary results from the survey indicate that many other physicians are in 
favor of off-label prescribing but are against loosening FDA requirements.  
Since your response differs we would like to explore this in a little more detail. 
 
In particular, we are interested in your evaluation of the following argument. 
 
Because off-label indications have not been FDA-certified for efficacy, off-label 
prescribing is very much like prescribing a new drug that has met FDA safety 
but not efficacy requirements.  Therefore, one should either be in favor of 
doctors being allowed to prescribe off-label *and* being allowed to prescribe 
new drugs that have met safety but not FDA efficacy requirements, or against 
both allowances. 
 
How do the following choices best reflect your thoughts on this argument? 
•  I think the consistency argument makes a lot of sense; it agrees with 
the reasons behind my responses.  [Use other box for further 
response.] 
76% [50] 
                              
•  I think there’s merit to the argument but other considerations explain 
my responses. [Use other box for further response.] 
       20% [13] 
•  It is for other reasons that I have favored allowance in both of my 
replies; the consistency argument is faulty because [Use other box for 
further  response.]     5% [3] 
 
                                                 
12We did not get the idea of asking the “consistent” respondents what they thought of the consistency 
argument until after the survey was in progress.  Thus not every consistent respondent encountered this 
question.  The consistency question always came last in the survey (save the final solicitation of final 
comments), so adding the question could not have changed the distribution of answers to the preceding 
questions. 
  15We saw that most “inconsistent” respondents rejected the consistency 
argument.  Here we see that most “consistent” respondents accepted it.  Indeed, 95 
percent saw merit in the argument.   
Finally, all respondents came to a page inviting them to share any “thoughts or 
ideas about the questions in the survey,” again in an open-ended format.  This 
provided yet another stream of feedback. 
In the Appendix we discuss two correlations – support for FDA liberalization 
increases markedly among practitioners as opposed to researchers, and support for 
liberalization increases with reported rates of off-label prescribing. Now we turn to 
the written comments on the consistency argument. 
 
IV.  The “Virtual Conversations” 
 
Of the 205 “inconsistent” physicians who explicitly deemed the consistency 
argument invalid, 176 wrote something in the “because” box.  We read those 
comments with a charitable eye for challenges to the consistency argument for 
reform.
13  We have organized the comments into a series of three challenges.  In 
presenting a challenge our first responsibility is to set out the idea as the physician 
respondents themselves would approve; that is, to represent their idea fully and 
faithfully.  We then give a response, the next step on our part in the conversation.  In 
formulating responses we often draw upon the remarks of other physicians.  
Sometimes we step out of the conversation and offer observations or comments on 
what the physicians said, to shed light on the character of those comments or to 
                                                 
13 The complete set of comments has been put into a compendium available online.  Each comment is 
marked to indicate any relatedness to the challenges.  Also, some comments contained no clear theory 
that we could discern  (comments that simply restated positions, justify only one of the positions taken 
by the respondent, or describe the respondent’s own prescription practices). 
  16enlarge the context of the conversations.  We use sub-headings to separate the various 
“voices.” 
Before turning to the challenges in detail we set out a conceptual framework 
that will be useful in understanding and evaluating the challenges. 
 
The “Knowledge Effect” versus the “Suppression Effect” 
The physicians’ challenges point to a good effect and a bad effect of efficacy 
requirements, whether on initial or subsequent uses.  The good effect is that to some 
degree requirements induce the pharmaceutical company to fund the requisite studies 
and thereby enhance knowledge beyond the level otherwise attained.  Call this the 
“knowledge effect.”  “Better knowledge” may mean more information about specific 
drugs but also includes the eradication or avoidance of spurious and useless ideas.  
Improving the quality of knowledge in the system is obviously a good thing.  Thus 
one physician wrote that “Without an efficacy study requirement, many studies would 
never be done and the world would not really know if the drug works.”  “However,” 
this same physician continued, “those same studies end up costing the US and 
pharmaceutical [companies] a great deal of money (f42).”  
  Efficacy requirements increase the costs, delays, and uncertainties involved 
in developing and getting initial and subsequent indications to legal status.
14  Many 
physicians noted this consequence of requirements: 
 
Many well accepted therapies are not FDA approved as there is tremendous 
cost in time and money to gain approval. (f9) 
 
The time to certify efficacy (by the FDA) is frequently excessive. (g85) 
 
                                                 
14 DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2002) estimate that the average cost of getting a drug to legal status 
is $800 million.  On the uncertainty of obtaining permitting, see DiMasi 2002. 
  17Medical research is generally much ahead of the FDA regulatory process. 
(g173) 
 
To mount a full study and provide the mountain of paperwork required by the 
FDA to justify a use would markedly limit our armamentarium. (f74) 
 
I don’t want to wait until the pharmaceutical company jumps through all of the 
FDA hoops for each use. (g7) 
 
The costs of gaining FDA approval will in some cases discourage the actors in 
the entire nexus of medicine from bringing the indication forth.  This is the 
“suppression effect.”  Efficacy requirements increase the knowledge about the 
indications that do become available, but suppresses their number.   
A tradeoff between knowledge and suppression may accommodate different 
policy positions in differing cases.  Again, most physicians supported initial-use but 
not subsequent-use efficacy requirements  There were two common challenges 
suggesting why the tradeoff favors efficacy-requirements for initial but not 
subsequent uses.   
 
A.  The relatedness challenge: 
 
The pharmacological mechanisms of off-label uses are closely related to those 
of the on-label uses. 
 
The most common challenge to the consistency argument involves the idea of 
related pharmacological mechanisms.  The simplest case is out-of-age prescribing: 
 
Off label use can mean using a drug under FDA age limits – for example, 
Zyrtec in a 1 year old. (g57) 
 
  18Many off-label uses in my case are in children younger than the approved 
ages.  The efficacy has been tested and proven for the given use, just not in 
these age groups. (g166) 
 
 
Indeed, 80 to 90 percent of pediatric patient regimens involve at least one off-
label prescription (Jaffe 1994; Kauffman 1996).  In making the relatedness argument, 
22 physicians specifically cited age classes or pediatrics.  But many others presented 
the argument in more general terms, speaking of related mechanisms, similarities of 
drugs within a given class, proven activeness of the drug, prescribing “by analogy,” 
and “extrapolating” from on-label to off-label.  One physician illustrated the argument 
plainly by saying: 
 
Some of the newer antihistamines were initially only indicated for the 
treatment of seasonal allergic rhinitis, but not for perennial allergic rhinitis.  
Well, there is no difference in the allergic cascade and mechanism of seasonal 
and perennial allergic rhinitis and their response to antihistamines.  
Consequently, most allergists prescribed them for both forms of rhinitis before 
the FDA published its official approval of indications. (g93) 
 
 
The force of the consistency argument for liberalization comes from the 
premise that off-label prescribing is like prescribing a new drug that has not been 
efficacy-certified by the FDA.  The relatedness argument challenges this premise by 
arguing that off-label prescribing is not that different from on-label prescribing.  In 
this view, prescribing a drug that has not been FDA efficacy-certified is like searching 
in the dark while prescribing off-label is like searching in the dusky light cast by the 
nearby lamp of the on-label use.  
In terms of the beneficial “knowledge effect” of efficacy requirements, these 
doctors are saying that the knowledge effect is large for initial uses but, because of the 
accretion of knowledge through experience, not so large for subsequent uses.  In other 
words, once a drug is released in its initial use, the further imposition of efficacy 
  19requirements for subsequent uses would not be important to advancing knowledge 
about those subsequent efficacies.  Thus, for the subsequent uses the knowledge effect 
is swamped by the deleterious suppression effect.  As noted, the survey respondents 
resoundingly opposed the imposition of new requirements on off-label prescribing 
because such requirements would suppress many important uses.   
 
Response to the Relatedness Challenge 
Our response to the relatedness argument is usefully contrasted with the 
FDA’s response.  Though exercising some judgment and flexibility, the FDA does not 
put great confidence in the relatedness argument.  The FDA does not regard 
relatedness as anything like a sure thing.  Crossing age divisions and going from 
seasonal to perennial allergic rhinitis may have been reasonable – but sometimes age 
and seasonality differences do matter which is why the FDA maintains these 
distinctions.  Similarly, a senior associate commmisioner of the FDA criticized the 
relatedness argument with respect to drug classes by writing that “physicians may 
assume that all members of the drug class will behave similarly, and prescribe them 
interchangeably.  This assumption, however, may be very risky, because all members 
of a drug class do not behave identically (Suydam 1999).” 
We take a middle ground between that of the physicians and the FDA.   The 
challenging physicians observe that off-label uses are often related to on-label uses 
and suggest that the gap between related uses and effective uses is easily bridged.  
The FDA observes that related drugs do not always have related effects and argues 
that the gap is too large to be safely bridged absent its own approved clinical trials.  
But in practice the gap between related indications and effective indications is bridged 
by a sophisticated process of testing and evaluation involving universities, hospitals, 
  20non-profit health foundations, manufacturers, researchers, scientific journals, 
compendia, and other institutions. 
Each newly permitted drug projects a wide range of theoretically related and 
possibly effective off-label indications, and the promise of each gradually diminishes 
the farther (in terms of current medico-pharmacological understanding) such 
prospective indications are from the on-label indications.   But being 
pharmacologically related to the on-label use and actually being effective are two 
very different things.  Ex ante, the successful extrapolation to effective off-label 
indications is not typically a sure thing. 
Medical science explores possibly useful related uses and if those possibilities 
appear to pan out it adopts them and brings them into professional listings such as the 
leading formularies and compendia.  There are, of course, cases of improper 
prescribing and consequent suffering.
15  But, generally speaking, medicine does not 
adopt related (or potentially related) indications that are not effective.  
One physician wrote: “Most of the drugs I use for diseases such as lupus, AS, 
Reiters, Behcet’s, vasculitis, etc etc etc are off-label” (g104).  Surely, this doctor’s 
therapeutic arsenal is not based chiefly on sure thing extrapolation from on-label 
indications.  Throughout the responses, physicians provided many examples – 
antileukotrianes, verapamil, Amiodarone, elavil, plaguenil, cyclobenzaprene, 
Depakote ER (g107, g14, g20, g58, f157, c11) – in which important off-label uses – 
though perhaps related to – were not direct or certain extrapolations from the on-label 
uses. Related uses are transformed into off-label uses through a decentralized process 
of medical evaluation.  
 
                                                 
15 See Lazarou, Pomeranz, and Corey 1998 on adverse drug reactions in hospital patients. 
  21Further Response to the Relatedness Challenge 
In many cases, the off-label use is not significantly related to the on-label use.  
Decades ago, quinacrine was approved for malaria, and chlorpromazine for 
schizophrenia.  Both drugs have recently been found to be potential treatments for 
Bovine-Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (BJD), commonly known as mad-cow disease.  
Because these drugs were already approved for another use, BJD patients could begin 
taking them within months of the publication of scientific papers suggesting their 
effectiveness.  If these drugs had been new they could not have been marketed until 
completion of FDA approved clinical trials – a process that could have taken a decade 
or more.  Indeed, BJD is rare, so the cost of this process would almost certainly have 
kept any company from funding the necessary trials.   The drugs could be prescribed 
as soon as physicians and patients evaluated the risk-return tradeoff favorably only 
because they had been permitted for other uses.  With respect to treating BJD, 
quinacrine and chlorpromazine were essentially new drugs.  The consistency 
argument asks, Why should other patients, not so lucky as to be in need of an old drug 
with new uses, not have access to new drugs on the same terms? 
The role of serendipity in discovering off-label uses also testifies to the 
unrelatedness of such uses.  Minoxidil, for example, was developed as a drug for the 
treatment of hypertension but after users reported unusual hair growth it later became 
much more widely used under the brand name Rogaine as a treatment for baldness.  
Thalidomide is used on-label for the treatment of leprosy but as one physician wrote 
“we found by serendipity that it was effective in myeloma and supported by the peer 
review literature” (g134).  Another wrote: 
We frequently find uses for drugs that the FDA has not realized yet.  A good 
example is the use of verapamil for treatment of headaches. This was initially 
(and still is) primarily a cardiovascular drug, however patients started 
reporting that their headaches had improved or gone away while on this drug, 
  22so it was a simple step for physicians to begin trying this drug for a different 
indication.  I don't know that the FDA has ever approved this drug for 
headaches [it has not - the authors], but we use it, and it works. (g14) 
 
Finally, “relatedness” is a tricky concept and its presence (or absence) may be 
more obvious ex-post than ex-ante.  Prozac, for example, is used on-label to treat 
depression but it is also prescribed off-label for the treatment of alcoholism.  Are 
these treatments related?  Since the etiology of neither depression nor alcoholism is 
well understood one could not conclude on the basis of theory that these diseases were 
related.  Indeed, one of the few reasons to think that these diseases bear some relation 
to one another is that Prozac has had some limited success in treating both (Naranjo et 
al. 1988).  In this case, relatedness, to the extent that it exists, is more suggested by 
off-label prescribing than a cause of such prescribing.   
 
Side Comment on Relatedness and Drug Permitting 
Studies of the FDA’s counterparts in the U.K. and Spain find those drug-
permitting agencies to be as effective as the FDA in screening out unsafe drugs 
(Bakke, Wardell, and Lasagna 1984, Bakke et al 1995).  The relatedness challenge, 
therefore, does suggest FDA reform in another direction. If doctors should be allowed 
to prescribe across age populations or other “closely related” groups then shouldn’t 
doctors be allowed to cross national populations?  A drug’s pharmacological 
mechanisms in British patients are extremely closely related to its mechanisms in 
American patients.  The relatedness challenge, then, bolsters the case for having the 
FDA automatically permit any drug that has been legally permitted in Canada, 
Australia, Britain, Spain, Sweden,  – or whatever set of countries are deemed to have 
sound permitting agencies.  This proposal is sometimes referred to as “reciprocity,” 
though the logic holds even if automatic approval is only one-way.  The proposal has 
  23not to our knowledge been included in a survey of physicians; it would be interesting 
to see how physicians who favor FDA efficacy requirements respond to this line of 
argument. 
 
B.  The incentive challenge:  
 
Efficacy requirements generate knowledge but because of differential incentives 
arising from the temporal limit on patent protection, efficacy requirements 
suppress fewer drugs when placed on initial uses than they would if placed on 
subsequent uses.  This difference recommends opposite policies in the two cases. 
 
Numerous doctors responded to the consistency argument by saying, absent 
initial efficacy requirements, “companies would not have incentives to provide 
efficacy studies” (g90).  (Physicians also pointed out that FDA efficacy studies also 
increased knowledge of safety thus removing efficacy requirements would also 
diminish safety knowledge.)  But “there are many instances where the market for a 
new indication for an old, off-patent drug is too small for a drug company to have any 
incentive to fund an FDA approval process. Would manufacturers of generic drugs 
have any economic reason to fund such an approval?  In many cases, the answer 
would be no” (g95).
16  The balance of the knowledge effect and the suppression effect 
, these physicans say, favors initial efficacy requirements because the suppression 
effect is not so large, since the company will begin selling the drug while the patent is 
young, and the knowledge effect is large, since apart from clinical testing of the new 
drug there would be little experience with it.  But for subsequent uses the balance 
                                                 
16 Other challenges along these lines are g20, g40, g58, g59, g79, g104, g115, g121, and g134. 
  24opposes efficacy requirements because the suppression effect would large, since the 
patent is old, and the knowledge effect is not so large, since medicine is learning from 
the drug’s initial indications.   
 
Response to the Incentive Challenge 
We agree that a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s willingness to pay for putting a 
drug through the FDA process depends on the market exclusivity afforded by a patent.  
If a drug is not under patent, then other firms that did not incur costs of drug 
development would compete and drive prices below the profit point.  Since 
subsequent uses are discovered after a drug has been on the market for some time, 
they are discovered when the patent is winding down or has expired.  The incentives 
to fund efficacy studies for subsequent uses dwindle as time wears on – even if the 
subsequent uses are highly valuable to society as a whole.
17  Thus the fact that patent 
is winding down is a good argument in favor of not requiring FDA efficacy-
certification for off-label prescriptions. 
The incentive challenge maintains that, by and large, patents are a necessary 
but not sufficient inducement for producing efficacy studies — to create sufficiency 
we need FDA efficacy requirements.  One of the physicians who favored 
liberalization responded to this argument as follows: “A pharmaceutical company 
must support the efficacy of its drugs with clinical research to sell its product” (c22).  
The pharmaceutical company could not hope for the medical community to adopt its 
drug into standard care (or, at least not for very long) without professional, credible 
demonstration of its efficacy.  The dollar value of the patent on a superior new drug 
depends not merely on legal permission to supply the drug and some measure of 
                                                 
17 The FDA can and does grant what are in effect extensions to patents for producing new and valuable 
research but such privileges are difficult if not impossible to enforce when patents have expired (see 
Tabarrok 2001 for a discussion of exclusivity privileges).      
  25exclusivity in doing so, but on credibly demonstrating to the medical community that 
it is superior.   
Moreover, physicians pointed out that medical research is performed and paid 
for by many parties other than pharmaceutical companies – universities, large medical 
organizations such as HMOs, joint ventures among hospital groups, research non-
profits, government organizations such as the NIH, and others.  Physicians may 
underestimate the sagacity of their own profession, and the off-label experience 
illuminates the prospective world in which initial efficacy requirements are optional. 
Economist J. Howard Beales (1996) found that off-label uses that later came to be 
recognized by the FDA appeared in the US Pharmacopoeia on average 2.5 years 
before FDA recognition.  That the US Pharmacopoeia recognizes off-label indications 
years ahead of the FDA demonstrates that physicians and scientists have certified 
thousands of drug indications quite independently of the FDA even when those 
indications are not very closely related to the original indications.  The FDA has a 
monopoly on drug permitting, but not on drug-use certifying.  Here are some 
physicians remarks on the wider forms of recognition and certification used in 
medicine: 
 
Often efficacy information is already available from studies done outside the 
USA. (g47) 
 
There is often data from Europe or in peer review journals.  FDA efficacy 
trials are important, but they are not the only measure (except legally in terms 
of company marketing) of a product’s efficacy for a certain condition. (g28) 
 
Off label use is very often based on valid smaller studies concerning other than 
the index medical condition; those studies may not be large enough or the 
pharmaceutical company may not want to spend the $ it takes to get FDA 
approval. (g44) 
 
  26FDA approval on efficacy lags behind peer-reviewed data that may suggest 
efficacy.  I favor off-label use only if there is reasonable data, or reasonable 
inference, of efficacy . . . (g50) 
 
Almost all cancer chemotherapy is off-label.  There is no way 2 or 3 drug 
companies can expend the effort to get a combination regimen approved.  
Oncologists use the peer reviewed literature to decide therapy.  Almost always 
decisions are based on randomized clinical trials. (g53) 
 
Plaquenil was developed and FDA-approved as a malarial drug.  Later it was 
found to relieve Rheumatoid arthritis symptoms in the patients taking it for 
malaria.  Studies show that it worked and was efficacious but should we wait 
for the FDA to prolong the relief of pain and suffering for several years while 
the necessary drug company/FDA studies are done or just use common sense?  
Often there is no financial incentive for a drug company to pursue off label 
indications for conditions that wouldn’t generate sufficient income to offset 
the cost of FDA approved trials.  But university based, double blind, highly 
powered studies show benefits that outweigh risks. (g58) 
 
Some of the physicians recognized the importance and validity of the 
decentralized testing process that certifies off-label uses yet they also revealed an 
allegiance to status-quo FDA procedure.  Consider the following complete remark:  
 
Most of the drugs that I deal with are only approved for one form of cancer.  
They are then put through trials in other diseases and these are recorded in the 
literature.  Those that show efficacy are then NON-FDA approved but 
COMPENDIUM approved and are paid for by insurance.  To allow any drug 
that has shown it is not toxic to be used for anything is bad science and bad 
policy. (g64) 
 
The last sentence strikes us a non sequitur.  The whole would make more 
sense if the last sentence read: Medical science can establish and certify efficacy, and 
thereby minimizing ineffective therapy, without the FDA.  We think that many doctors 
overestimate the knowledge effect of efficacy requirements because they 
underestimate medicine’s ability to weed out ineffective indications.  
 
 
  27Further Response: How large is the suppresion effect? 
The off-label experience testifies to the fact much knowledge about efficacy 
(and about safety) is produced outside the FDA regulatory apparatus. The natural 
incentives arising from economic interests, the patient’s self-interest, liability risks, 
professional pride and esteem, scientific curiosity and competition, and basic human 
morality create significant incentives to invest in knowledge creation.  Let us accept, 
however, that if initial efficacy requirements were dropped, there would be a decline 
in knowledge about new drugs.  However large the decline in knowledge might be, 
what matters in the final analysis is how it compares to the suppression effect.  The 
survey responses resoundingly recognized that requiring FDA efficacy certification 
for subsequent indications would greatly suppress those uses.  The physicians likely 
understand, therefore, that efficacy requirements on initial uses also suppress drug 
development.  The issue of patents can obscure this point.  The patent prospect 
induces only some firms to produce only some new drugs despite very high FDA 
certification costs.   But higher costs means fewer new drugs.  Some suppression 
occurs.  
Physicians are aware of the suppression effect with regard to drugs available 
in other countries.  Thus one physician commented:   
 
The FDA has already by its slowness kept us behind by several generations of 
new therapeutics.  In Seattle, we have the opportunity to sometimes send 
patients to Canada to get medications that are unavailable in the U.S.  (c187) 
 
But the suppression effect probably goes far beyond the benchmark of the 
union of Canada’s, Europe’s and America’s pharmacopoeias.  Even more serious than 
the suppression of drugs available in other countries is the suppression of drug 
  28development.  Sam Peltzman (1973) addressed the suppression effect of the 1962 
Kefauver-Harris which added a proof-of-efficacy requirement to the existing proof-of-
safety requirement, removed time constraints on the FDA disposition of NDAs, and 
gave the FDA extensive powers over the clinical testing procedures drug companies 
used to support their applications.  Using data from 1948 to 1962, Peltzman created a 
statistical model to predict the yearly number of new drug introductions.  Despite the 
model's simplicity, it tracks the actual number of new drug introductions quite well, as 




Figure 1:  According to Peltzman’s empirical research, the requirements 
imposed in 1962 significantly suppress the development of new drugs. 
 
  29Because Peltzman's model tracks the pre-1962 drug market quite well, we 
have some confidence that if all else had remained equal, the model also should have 
roughly tracked the post-1962 drug market.  Peltzman's model, in other words, 
estimates the number of new drugs that would have been produced if the FDA's 
powers had not been increased in 1962.  Thus, by comparing the model results with 
the actual number of new drugs, we can draw an estimate of the effect of the 1962 
amendments.  The model predicts a probable post-1962 average of 41 new chemical 
entities (NCEs, or new drugs) approved per year, yet in fact the average was only 16.  
The 1962 Amendments appear to be responsible for a 60 percent reduction in the 
number of new drugs.  The average number of new drugs introduced pre-1962 (40) 
was also much larger than the post-1962 average (16).  Thus, whether one compares 
pre- and post-1962 averages or compares the results from a forecast with the actual 
results, the conclusions are the same: the 1962 Amendments caused a significant drop 
in the introduction of new drugs.
18  Using data of longer span, Wiggins (1981) also 
found that increased FDA regulations raised costs and reduced the number of new 
drugs by approximately 60 percent. 
  Furthermore, we must recognize a difference in correction dynamics.  When 
the FDA is stingy in giving permission, or when efficacy requirements simply make 
certain lines of investigation uneconomic, drug development is stunted, and there is 
no reliable correction mechanism. The FDA can easily suppress a drug that could 
have saved tens of thousands of lives with little hint of controversy or even 
                                                 
18 Since 1962 marked not only the introduction of efficacy requirements but also of other new 
requirements, the measured impact of the 1962 amendments cannot be taken to be an exact 
measurement of the “suppression effect” as meant here.  Yet it is well-known that proof-of-efficacy 
was the most significant amendment in 1962, and that getting the FDA to “sign off” on efficacy is 
much more expensive, prolonged, and uncertain than getting it to “sign off” on safety, so there is good 
reason to take Peltzman’s measurement as demonstrating that the suppression effect on new drugs is 
large. 
  30acknowledgment.  This is quite unlike the correction that tends to occur when 
ineffective and unsafe drugs are released onto the market.   
Thus the suppression effect appears to be very large and this must be weighed 
in the balance when considering the loss of knowledge caused by making initial 
efficacy requirements voluntary.  
 
 
C.  The ‘flooding the market with ineffective drugs’ challenge  
 
Dropping efficacy requirements would flood the market with ineffective drugs; 
pharmaceutical companies would promote ineffective drugs and push them on 
patients and doctors. 
 
In a freer system drug manufactures and others would still have significant 
incentives to seek efficacy-certification of new drugs.  Yet the number of ineffective 
drugs on the market will also increase.  FDA regulation suppresses ineffective drugs 
even more than effective drugs.  Many of the anti-liberalizers wrote vehemently 
against “flooding” of the market with ineffective drugs.
19  “[T]hat’s what the makers 
of Aspercreme and Icy Hot are for!” (g87).  Several made reference to the “chaos” of 





                                                 
19 The term “flood” is used by g55, g87, g90, g148; and the concern is similarly expressed by many 
other challenges (see especially those in the PromoHaz section of the listing online). 
  31Response to the flooding challenge 
 
The absolute number of ineffective drugs is a poor guide to the cost of such 
drugs in the medical system because drug use is filtered by medicine.  If the filter 
works well, then society could gain even if many more ineffective drugs are matched 
by only a handful of additional effective drugs.  The ineffective drugs will be 
prescribed rarely while the effective drugs will be saving lives.
20  Some physicians, 
however, questioned the efficacy of the filtering process. 
[I]t is now commonplace for drug companies to directly market to the public 
which could bring unwanted patient pressure to bear on the MD to prescribe 
for the use not tested for efficacy.  (g100) 
 
Many physicians prescribe drugs based on the "flashiest ads" and detail 
representatives.  (g109) 
 
[P]hysicians sometimes give in to patient requests for medications even 
though they may not think that the drug is effective.  (g119) 
 
[P]hysicians and consumers alike often enjoy trying the newest, "best" thing 
on the market; this could allow a significant amount of prescribing of 
presumably safe pharmaceuticals with questionable benefit.  (g148) 
 
Just being safe is deceptive to consumers (patients) and allows pharmaceutical 
representatives, from whom most physicians seem to get most of their 
information, to twist information in all kinds of ways.  (g124) 
 
Given that 40% of physicians are willing to prescribe whatever the patient 
asks for, the result would be a mess.  (f64) 
 
But this fear of a flooding of the market appears to be inconsistent with the 
very extensive support that all physicians gave for off-label prescribing.  Today, all 
the drugs that have been permitted are available on the market and collectively 
                                                 
20 We hypothesize that ineffective drugs are more likely to be resorted to when the opportunity cost of 
such usage is low.  In particular, we suggest that ineffective drugs will be prescribed/used more often 
the safer they are and the fewer are effective alternatives.  Today, we see many questionable but 
relatively safe drugs being sold to treat sleeplessness, joint pain and memory problems (these drugs are 
often also sold OTC, without the filtering mechanism of prescriptions - but see Peltzman 1987 on 
prescriptions).  The costs of such questionable usage, however, is probably low.  Also, in cases of 
deadly and incurable conditions, doctors and patients sometimes resort to off-label and quite possibly 
ineffective prescriptions after conventional treatments have failed.  But the added hope, as well as 
experimentation, of the off-label system is in this case a benefit, not a cost. 
 
  32constitute an ocean of potential off-label treatments for every possible ailment.  Yet 
doctors do not randomly dip into this expanse and prescribe drugs without evidence of 
effectiveness. Thus, the possibility of many ineffective drugs being available does not 
really work as a challenge to the consistency argument, because the consistency 
argument carries the implication: So, then, why not prohibit off-label uses?  
Despite this apparent inconsistency the comments of those physicians who 
questioned the efficacy of the filtering mechanism do suggest important questions:  
How well does medicine filter out ineffective drugs?  And, how well would the filter 
have to work such that under liberalization the gain in the number of effective drugs 
would compensate for a higher tide of ineffective drugs?  Answering these questions 
is a good line for further research.    
Some respondents did provide a possible resolution of the inconsistency 
between fear of flooding and support of off-label prescribing as they spoke of a flood 
of new drugs that would be heavily promoted.  Thus, respondents wrote: 
If medicines were approved without proof of efficacy, this could lead to 
worsening of the current problems brought on by overaggressive advertising 
without evidence. (g59) 
 
Physicians would be  . . . subjected to barrages of claims from drug companies 
and would have a lot of difficulty evaluating them for accuracy. Drug 
companies are notorious for misrepresenting their products.  (g14) 
 
[The efficacy requirements prevent] the chaos that now exists with alternative 
medicine "Natural Herbal Medications" which make unsubstantiated claims as 




Responses to the promotion challenge 
 
The promotion challenge calls for two responses.  First, the reform proposal to 
make efficacy requirements optional, as put in the survey question, did not specify 
one way or the other how issues of drug promotion would be handled.  The 
  33respondents presumed that, under the reform, drug companies would enjoy the same 
promotion privileges that a company today enjoys in promoting the on-label uses of 
an FDA permitted drug.  But it would actually be more in keeping with the 
consistency argument to suggest that drug companies that did not get FDA efficacy 
certification for an indication would only be allowed the same (limited) promotional 
freedoms that they enjoy today for off-label uses. 
A second response would meet these respondents head-on, arguing that it 
would be a good thing, under the only-safety-requirements proposal, to grant 
pharmaceutical companies freedoms of speech like those enjoyed today in promoting 
on-label uses.  We will not pursue that line of argumentation, but merely note that a 
substantial body of scholarly work by economists and others develops a respectable 
case for the self-correcting dynamics and social benefits of the freedom of speech in 
health products and foods (Leffler 1981; Ippolitio and Mathios 1991, 1995; Ippolito 
and Pappalardo 2002; Masson and Rubin 1985; Rubin 1994, 1995; Keith 1995, Calfee 
1997, Tabarrok 2000). 
  
D.  Brief Treatment of Other Challenges 
 
Many physicians rebutted the consistency argument by saying “efficacy 
requirements make drugs safer” (r70).  Phase I and other parts of the FDA process 
specifically oriented toward safety provide what may be called s
1 level of general 
safety knowledge or assurance, while the full set of FDA requirements, including 
those geared toward efficacy, provide a higher or extended level s
x.  The challenge 
would seem to maintain that the higher level of safety assurance s
x ought to be 
required, and that therefore the current “efficacy” requirements ought to be retained.  
We feel that this response does not deflect the thrust of the consistency argument.  
  34Even if one were to grant that the FDA ought to require s
x, there would be no reason 
to achieve that by testing for efficacy in one particular use.  And if the FDA 
implemented requirements explicitly formulated for ensuring the higher level of 
safety, then any remaining efficacy requirements would be open to challenge by the 
consistency argument.   
It’s revealing that the physicians did not make one argument that is common in 
the literature.  Shapiro (1979) and Christopher (1993) both hold that  imposing 
efficacy requirements on subsequent uses would be desirable but they recognize that 
such requiremenets would be intrusive and difficult to enforce and for that reason it 
could be (second) best to allow off-label prescribing.  None of the physicians made 
this argument.  Virtually all the doctors in the survey would join us in saying that the 
debate is over whether to drop efficacy requirements on initial uses, not whether to 
impose them on subsequent uses.  
  
V.   Physicians Endorse Liberalization and the Consistency Argument 
 
We have focused on the status-quo respondents and their challenges.  This 
may give a misleading account of the support for the consistency argument for 
reform.  Recall, that  32 percent of those physicians with a definite opinion favored 
the elimination of initial efficacy requirements.  And, again,, 76 percent of such 
liberalizers said the consistency argument “makes a lot of sense” plus another 20 
percent said “there’s merit” to the argument. 
These dissidents from the status quo made many pro-liberalization comments.  
Here is a sample: 
  35The patients need my help and trust my judgment. If through my own 
evaluation I find a use for a drug my patients needs, I don't care what opinion 
of [it] the FDA has. (c6) 
 
I practiced for several years in CentroAmerica where the use of drugs is 
without any "FDA" approval and never had any problems with the new 
medication, as a matter fact I remember when we first use Zythromax. (f79) 
 
You might have asked – Are there instances where you can document patient 
harm by the current process?  STI571 for CML is a recent fine example where 
efficacy and safety data appeared to be present for 6-9 months before actual 
approval . . . (f140) 
 
There is a direct relationship between the physician and the patient and this 
allows a more accurate choice of alternative medications to be used in the 
medical treatment.  The FDA is too distant to the reality of medicine that they 
need to reevaluate their procedures. (c9) 
 
The FDA must change the way drugs are currently approved.  The current 
process is too expensive, limited in scope and of little benefit in clinical 
practice.  (f145) 
 
[T]he FDA needs to get real and allow people who practice medicine do so. 
(c17) 
 
Our hands are tied enough in medicine.  Please don't add more tether. (f74) 
 
Medicine is already bogged down in governmental regulation. (f63) 
 
Regulations are the bane of our practice.  (f168) 
 
[O]ne does not want an official, politicized body like the FDA to control the 
practice of medicine; scientific information should be the basis for decisions 
made by a free scientific community, not constrained by official sanction.  Not 
infrequently, the "official" view is wrong . . .  Physicians, as trained 
practitioners applying the science of medicine, should have the equivalent of 
academic freedom.  We are adequately constrained by considerations of 
liability risk and our professionalism. (c18) 
  36VI. Concluding  Comments 
 
Is the consistency argument against initial efficacy requirements foolish?  To 
address that question, this investigation goes beyond mere precept, anecdote, and 
individual opinion.  It taps the working knowledge of hundreds of physicians and 
organizes their insights and interpretations into a number of carefully formulated 
challenges to the consistency argument.  We have called the investigation a form of 
scientific testing.  What, then, are the test results? 
The investigation makes clear that liberalization proponents cannot wield the 
consistency argument as though it were a broadsword that cuts by clean logic through 
the status-quo efficacy requirements.  The expert “local” knowledge of some 500 
physicians has pointed to complications in the argument but, in our judgment, has not 
produced a strong rebuttal.  Many of the comments of the 500 physicians supported 
the consistency argument for FDA liberalization.  But important, complex issues like 
FDA policy always involve broad-gauge issues of interpretation and even of the 
proper vision of the polity, so others’ judgments may differ from our own.  Hence we 
have striven to render our arguments and those of the dissenting and concurring 
physicians as clearly as possible.    
The off-label market provides a window onto how a less regulated drug 
certification system would operate, but the physician comments raise many important 
questions for future research.  How related are off-label to on-label uses?  How should 
relatedness be assessed?  When an off-label use is unrelated, how is that use certified?  
How quickly does the process work?  How do these processes compare with the 
FDA?  Is there a lot of off-label usage that is ineffective?  To what extent does 
  37medicine filter out ineffective uses when superior therapies are available?  In safety 
and effectiveness, how do off-label compare to on-label uses? 
Little research on off-label prescribing has been done.  In drawing attention to 
the consistency argument and its challenges, we hope to shed light on off-label 
prescribing and its significance in the comparative analysis of regulatory institutions.   
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Correlations between Liberalization and Other Variables 
We investigated whether support for liberalization correlated with other 
variables.  Table 1 reports a probit regression for which the dependent variable was 1 
if the physician favored making FDA efficacy certification optional and 0 if he 
opposed that reform.  (We dropped respondents answering Don’t know/ Not sure).
21  
Independent variables included years of practice, whether the physician worked at a 
teaching hospital, was a pediatrician, physician career type, and off-label usage.  
Years in practice, working in a teaching hospital and being a pediatrician had no 
discernible effect on support for FDA liberalization. The responses to the career 
question are divided between Strictly Practitioner, Mainly a Practitioner, About Half 
Practitioner-Half Researcher, and Mainly Researcher.  We dropped Strictly 
Practitioner, so read the coefficients on the other career variables as relative to 
physicians who are Strictly Practitioners.  We find that those who are mainly 
practitioners are about 5 % less likely than strict practitioners to support liberalization, 
although the effect is not statistically significant.  Physicians who report splitting their 
time evenly between practice and research, however, are 22 % less likely than strict 
practitioners to support liberalization, and those who mainly do research are about 25 
% less likely, with both coefficients statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  One 
interpretation of the result might be that practicing physicians are more sensible to the 
heterogeneity of patients’ conditions and in closer contact with the patients who lose 
out because of FDA restrictions.  Hence, practicing physicians are more cognizant of 
the costs of FDA restrictions and less enamored with the FDA.  Another interpretation 
is that physicians who do research have a stronger allegiance to official institutions 
                                                 
21 We also dropped respondents if there were missing or not sure answers on the independent variables. 
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Table 1: Probit Regression of Support for FDA Liberalization 
 
Variable Marginal  Effect 
(Standard Error) 
Years -0.0003 
   (0.002)   
Teaching Hospital (Yes=1, No=0)  -0.030 
   (0.053) 
Pediatrics (Yes=1, No=0)  -0.004 
   (0.055) 
Mainly a Practitioner  -0.052 
   (0.054) 
Half Practitioner, Half Researcher  -0.220 
   (0.062)** 
Mainly a Researcher  -0.247 
   (0.089)** 
Off-Label Usage  0.40 




Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5 % 
** significant at 1 %   
 
We also find that physicians who report greater off-label prescribing are more 
likely to support making efficacy standards optional.  The coefficient on off-label 
usage indicates that a 1 % increase in reported off-label prescribing increase the 
probability of supporting FDA reform by 0.40 %.
22  Thus an increase of one standard 
deviation, about 12 percentage points, would raise predicted support for liberalization 
by just under 5 percentage points.  It seems that physicians who regularly prescribe 
                                                 
22 To run the regression we set off-label use at the means of the respective intervals, thus 10-20% was 
set at 15% (40% or more was set at 45%).   
  40off-label (or, who are aware that they do so) are more likely to embrace private, 
voluntary forms of efficacy certification.     
Table 2 shows support for FDA liberalization by area of specialization (for 
areas with at least 20 respondents).  We find no statistical significance between the 
rates. 
 
Table 2: Percent of Physicians Who Support 
 Making FDA Efficacy Certification Optional,  
by Area of Specialization 
 
 
Area  Percent Supporting Liberalization
 
Allergy  34.7%   [23]
 
Cardiology  25.6%   [39]
Internal 
Medicine  35.2%   [122]
 
Neurology  27.7%   [36]
 
Oncology  36.3%   [33]
 




  41 
REFERENCES 
 
Bakke, O. M., W. M. Wardell, and L. Lasagna. 1984. Drug Discontinuations in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, 1964 to 1983: Issues of Safety. Clinical 
pharmacology and therapeutics 35:559-67. 
 
Bakke, O. M., M. Manocchia, de F. Abajom, K. Kaitin, and L. Lasagna. 1995. Drug 
Safety Discontinuations in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Spain 
from 1974 Through 1993: A Regulatory Perspective. Clinical pharmacology 
and therapeutics 58 (1):108-17. 
 
Beales III, J. H. 1996. New uses for old drugs. In Competitive Strategies in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, ed. R. B. Helms, 281-305. Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute. 
 
Bewley, Truman F. 1999. Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession. Cambridge, 
MA. Harvard University Press. 
 
Blinder, A., Canetti, E., Lebow, D. and Rudd, J. 1998. Asking About Prices: A New 
Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Brosgart, C. L., T. Mitchell, E. Charlebois, R. Coleman, S. Mehalkol, J. Young, and D. 
I. Abrams. 1996. Off-Label Drug Use in Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Disease. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr Hum Retrovirol 12 (1):56-62. 
 
Calfee, J. E. 1997. Fear of Persuasion: A New Perspective On Advertising and 
Regulation. Monnaz, Switzerland: Agora Assoc. with AEI Press. 
 
Christopher, William L. 1993. Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory 
Vacuum. Food and Drug Law Journal 48: 247-262. 
 
Competitive Enterprise Institute. 2002. “A National Survey of Oncologists Regarding 
the Food and Drug Administration.” A poll conducted by The Polling Company.  




Dimasi, Joseph A. 2002. Uncertainty in Drug Development: Approval Success Rates 
for New Drugs. Clinical Drug Trials and Tribulations, 2nd ed.  A. Cato and L. 
Sutton, eds. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.:361-77 
 
DiMasi, J. A., R. W. Hansen, and H. G. Grabowski. 2002. The Price of Innovation: 
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs. Journal of Health Economics (in 
press). 
 
  42GAO. 1991. U.S. General Accounting Office Report: Off-Label Drugs: Initial Results 
of a National Survey. GAO/PEMD 91-14. 
 
 
Ippolito, P. M., and A. D. Mathios. 1991. Health Claims in Food Marketing: Evidence 
On Knowledge and Behavior in the Cereal Market. Journal of Public Policy and 
Marketing 10 (1):15-32. 
 
---. 1995. Information and Advertising: The Case of Fat Consumption in the United 
States. American Economic Review 85 (2):91-95. 
 
Ippolito, P. M., and Janis K. Pappalardo. 2002. Advertising Nutrition & Health: 
Evidence from Food Advertising, 1977-1997.  Federal Trade Commission 
Bureau of Economics Staff Report. Washington DC: Federal Trade 
Commission. 
 
Jaffe, S. Y. 1994. Statement before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment: 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, February 8. 
 
Kauffman. R. 1996. Off-Label Drug Use and the FDA: Review of Supplemental Drug 
Applications. Testimony by the American Academy of Pediatrics before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources and the Intergovernmental Relations 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 
September 12. 
 
Keith, A. 1995. Regulating Information About Aspirin and the Prevention of Heart 
Attack. American Economic Review 85 (2):96-99. 
 
Kessler, David. 1978. Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved 
Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Harvard Journal on Legislation 
15 
 
Klein, Daniel B and Alexander Tabarrok. 2002.  Is the FDA Safe and Effective?  
www.FDAReview.org.  Oakland: The Independent Institute. 
 
Lazarou, J., B. H. Pomeranz, and P. N. Corey. 1998. Incidence of Adverse Drug 
Reactions in Hospitalized Patients. Journal of the American Medical 
Association 279:1200-1205. 
 
Leffler, Keith B. 1981. Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription 
Drugs Advertising. Journal of Law and Economics, 24(1): 45-74. 
 
Masson, A. and P.H. Rubin. 1985. Matching Prescription Drugs and Consumers. New 
England Journal of Medicine 313 (August 22): 513-15. 
 
Naranjo CA, Sellers EM, Sanhueza P, et al. 1988. The serotonin uptake inhibitor, 
fluoxetine, reduced alcohol consumption in problem drinkers. 
Psychopharmacology. 96(Suppl):311. 
 
  43Peltzman, S. 1973. An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug 
Amendments. Journal of Political Economy 81 (5):1049-91. Reprinted in 
George J. Stigler (ed). Chicago Studies in Political Economy, (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1988) pp. 303-348. 
 
Rubin, P. H. 1994. Are Pharmaceutical Ads Deceptive? Food and Drug Law Journal 49 
(1): 7-19. 
 
Rubin, P. H. 1995. FDA Advertising Restrictions: Ignorance is Death. In Hazardous to 
Our Health? FDA Regulation of Health Care Products, ed. R. Higgs, 29-53. 
Oakland, CA.: The Independent Institute. 
 
Shapiro, S. A. 1979. Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for Any Purpose: 
The Need for FDA Regulation. Northwestern University Law Review 73 
(5):801-72. 
 
Suydam, Linda A. 1999. Keynote Address by Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., Senior 
Associate Commissioner, FDA for FDLI Conference on Advertising and 
Promotion in the New Millennium. Available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/offlabel.html 
 
Tabarrok, A. 2000. Assessing the FDA Via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug 
Prescribing. The Independent Review V (1):25-53. 
 
---. 2001. The Blessed Monopolies. Regulation,Winter: 1-4. 
 
Wiggins, S. N. 1981. Product Quality Regulation and New Drug Introductions: Some 
New Evidence from the 1970's. Review of Economics and Statistics 63:615-19. 
 
  44